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Introduction 
 The use of facial recognition technology (FR) by public and private actors has stirred 
controversy in recent months. There is a myriad of uses of facial recognition, some more ominous 
than others. Apple uses FR to map the contours of a user’s face to restrict access to the user’s 
phone.1  Coffee shops may incorporate facial recognition software into coffee makers to pour a 
cup of coffee for a yawning passerby.2 Consternation over FR arises more often, however, when 
the technology is used in less anodyne ways. Law enforcement’s use of FR has sparked outrage 
among civil liberty activist groups, resulting in litigation over possible privacy infringements.3 
Facial recognition service providers (FRSP’s) and tech investors watch these lawsuits carefully to 
gauge where courts are drawing the boundaries by which FR use by the government is legally 
permissible. But to understand the legality of government use of FR, we first have to understand 
how it is frequently developed and applied.  
 Law enforcement has increasingly hired facial recognition service providers to code 
software capable of “scraping” images off the Web. Web scraping is simply a term used to describe 
various methods used to extract data from websites. These images are scraped from images posted 
on third party platforms, including Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, etc.4 Subsequently, these images 
are shifted and stored into the software’s database.  
 
1 Maggie Tillman, What is Apple Face ID and how does it work?, Sep. 18, 2019, POCKET-LINT.COM,  
https://www.pocket-lint.com/phones/news/apple/142207-what-is-apple-face-id-and-how-does-it-work. 
2 Ron Dicker, Machine Dispenses Free Coffee When You Yawn, July 19, 2013, HUFFINGTON POST, 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/coffee-machine-yawn_n_3623787. 
3 Drew Harwell, ACLU sues FBI, DOJ over facial recognition technology criticizing unprecedented surveillance 
secrecy, Oct. 31, 2019, WASHINGTON POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/10/31/aclu-sues-
fbi-doj-over-facial-recognition-technology-criticizing-unprecedented-surveillance-secrecy/. 
4 Shivdeep Dhaliwal, Facebook Sends Cease And Desist Letter To AI Startup, Joins Twitter, Venmo, YouTube, Feb. 
6, 2020, YAHOO FINANCE, https://finance.yahoo.com/news/facebook-sends-cease-desist-letter-111645892.html. 
 
3 
 
 Government interest in FR surged following the terrorist attacks on 9/11.5 Following the 
Cold War, the United States did not have a major military hegemony to compete with. Instead, the 
emerging enemy was “asymmetric threats” or, in other words, unidentifiable enemies targeting 
“soft targets,” like malls and airports.6 Asymmetric threats do not play by conventional rules of 
war. The United States realized it was going to be forced to employ unorthodox, legally suspect 
ways to combat asymmetric threats. Around this timeframe, the United States was excelling in 
technological development. The government viewed FR as an opportunity use its strengths in its 
fight against these new threats. Biometrics industries sprung out of this time period.7 As innovation 
spurred, robust FR systems were developed. To date, the system nearest to being able to identify 
faces in a crowd using real-time surveillance is the Biometric Optical Surveillance System 
(BOSS).8 Developed through funding from the Department of Homeland Security, BOSS is still 
used today. BOSS can use video cameras to scan people in public and then identify the names of 
individuals by cross-referencing their faces with other databases.9  
 Today law enforcement agencies can access similar databases at any time for its 
investigations. For example, if a convenience-store camera captures footage of a burglar breaking 
and entering the store, assuming the image is of high enough quality, law enforcement can use the 
software to match the image with one of the images in its database. Technological advancements 
in the fields of photography and videography, however, have facilitated better opportunities for 
stock images, worthy of facial recognition, to appear in image databases.10 Matching the image 
 
5 Eric Z. Wynn, Privacy in the face of surveillance: Fourth Amendment considerations for facial recognition 
technology, NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL, 19 (2015).  
6 Eric Z. Wynn, Supra Note 5.  
7 Kelly A. Gates, Our Biometric Future: Facial Recognition Technology and the Culture of Surveillance, 100 
(2011). 
8 Eric Z. Wynn, supra Note 5 at 22.  
9 Ginger McCall, The Face Scan Arrives, THE NEW YORK TIMES, August 30, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/30/opinion/the-face-scan-arrives.html?_r=0. 
10 Federal Trade Commission, FTC Recommends Best Practices for Companies That Use Facial 
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does not necessarily have to be executed manually. The software can unilaterally measure the 
biometric landmarks of a person’s face, including the nose, face, eyes, skin pores and pair those 
results with another image in the database to find a match. Law enforcement has used this tool to 
shave time usually spent on investigations from weeks to mere hours.11  
Some argue this tool greatly enhances civil liberty and dignity by reducing the pool of 
suspects; thus, reducing the costs and humiliation entailed in being a suspect in a criminal 
investigation.12 Facial recognition technology has the potential to greatly enhance policing and 
government security efficiency in the United States. The advancement of FR could potentially 
accomplish in seconds what would take hundreds or thousands of man-hours to complete 
manually. The decades-long development of FR is coming to a point where, in the near future, 
personal information about people can be so quickly accessed that their identity, location, and 
other personal information can be determined and logged within seconds. This technology, if left 
unregulated by law, should be particularly troubling to those who have no reason to be concerned 
with law enforcement surveillance. Richard Posner, an American jurist, argues that when privacy 
values are compared to security from terror-related deaths often associated with asymmetric 
tactics, privacy should lose to security.13 Posner goes even further in a later writing, arguing that 
individuals often use privacy law as a cover for the disreputable parts of our character.14 Posner, 
like many others, share the view that privacy rights are overvalued and diminish very little 
 
Recognition Technologies, October 22, 2012, http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2012/10/ftcrecommends-best-practices-companies-use-facial-recognition. 
11 Lee Kicker, How Criminal Investigations Can Be Expedited Using Facial Recognition, May 7, 2018, NEC 
Corporation of America, https://nectoday.com/how-criminal-investigations-can-be-expedited-using-facial-
recognition/#. 
12 Amitai Etzioni, Facial Recognition Meets the Fourth Amendment Test, Sep. 22, 2019, THE NATIONAL INTEREST, 
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/facial-recognition-meets-fourth-amendment-test-82311.  
13 Richard A. Posner, Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 80 (2006).  
14 See Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Surveillance, and Law, 75 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 245 
(2008). 
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freedom. However, the slippery-slope concerns that privacy advocates have about the FR’s 
potential for extensive abuse may not be completely without merit, as we will see. 
 FR certainly has its public benefits. But it is also a tool that can be easily abused if placed 
in the wrong hands.  China has employed a vast network surveillance system using FR to monitor 
and rank people based on their behaviors. This so-called “social credit system” imposes rewards 
and punishments on individuals based on the scores they receive. For example, behaviors like 
jaywalking and buying videogames have been deemed punishment-worthy behaviors that, if 
caught red-handed by the network, can lead to lower social credit. Some of the punishments for 
low social credit include restrictions on travel, employment opportunities, and school choice.15 
 China presents an example of the draconian use of FR, but the use of the technology in the 
United States has not been nearly as eerie. Many police departments have made clear that they do 
not engage in mass data gathering (e.g., placing cameras on street corners). Instead most police 
departments are transparent about their use of FR to local communities to convey an image of 
responsibility, professionalism, and to avoid media backlash.16 Clearview AI, a FRSP, has 
professed to only scraping publicly available images off social media sites.17 Compared to China’s 
social credit system, these uses are anodyne; however, concern about the ethics of FR gathering 
and application are growing among members of the private sector. Axon, a major police body 
camera manufacturer, has rejected selling FR, citing the findings of an independent ethics panel 
 
15 Alexandra Ma, China has started ranking citizens with a creepy 'social credit' system — here's what you can do 
wrong, and the embarrassing, demeaning ways they can punish you, Oct. 29, 2018, BUSINESS INSIDER, 
https://www.businessinsider.com/china-social-credit-system-punishments-and-rewards-explained-2018-4#5-
keeping-you-out-of-the-best-hotels-5. 
16 Associated Press, ACLU calls out Amazon, Washington Co. sheriff's office for facial recognition tech, May 22, 
2018, KGW8, https://www.kgw.com/article/money/aclu-calls-out-amazon-washington-co-sheriffs-office-for-facial-
recognition-tech/283-557099068. 
17 Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We Know It, Jan. 18, 2020, The New York 
Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-facial-recognition.html. 
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which found FR to not be advanced enough for law enforcement to depend on.18 Microsoft recently 
announced its refusal to continue investing in AnyVision, a FRSP, due to oversight concerns.19 
Facebook and Twitter have sent cease-and-desist letters to Clearview AI, demanding it stop 
scraping images off their websites in violation of their terms-of-service.20 
 Government crackdowns on FR have moved at warp speed. Legislators in San Francisco 
have already imposed an outright ban on government use of FR. But that’s not all. Additionally, 
any new plans to purchase FR must now be approved by city administrators. These measures are 
deemed drastic by some, especially among members of the law enforcement community. Some 
believe that a moratorium is more appropriate, as opposed to an outright ban. Experts believe that 
as the technology develops, ways to limit FR to responsible use will bloom. Senators Jeff Merkley 
(Oregon) and Cory Booker (New Jersey) have proposed a bill that would do just that. The bill, 
proposed in February, calls for a moratorium on using the technology until a commission 
recommends guidelines and limitations for government use.21 The bill does not restrict private 
purchases of FR.  
Federal consumer privacy laws are generally ineffective at hampering abuse of an 
individual’s personal information. There are a few reasons for this. For one, privacy law in the 
United States operates across subject matters (e.g., COPPA for children, HIPAA for health 
services, etc.) There is no blanket statutory regime governing consumer privacy. Second, consumer 
information has been protected by a self-regulatory regime articulated by the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC). This model, known as “notice and choice,” encourages firms to adopt 
 
18 First Report of the Axon AI & Policing Technology Ethics Board: pg. 28-30 (June, 2019). 
19 Nick Statt, Microsoft to end investments in facial recognition firms after AnyVision controversy, Mar. 27, 2020, 
THE VERGE, https://www.theverge.com/2020/3/27/21197577/microsoft-facial-recognition-investing-divest-
anyvision-controversy. 
20 Kashmir Hill, Twitter Tells Facial Recognition Trailblazer to Stop Using Site’s Photos, Jan. 22, 2020, THE NEW 
YORK TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/22/technology/clearview-ai-twitter-letter.html. 
21 Ethical Use of Facial Recognition Act, S. 3284, 116th Cong. (2019-2020).   
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substantive information protections via “privacy by design” and disclosure of its data collection 
practices to consumers. The notice-and-choice model was extended into the FTC’s best practices 
guideline for facial recognition, including a policy directing that digital signage using the 
technology not be set up where kids congregate.22 
Privacy by design incorporates substantive consumer protections into the firm’s practices 
including data security, reasonable limits on data collection, comprehensive data management 
procedures, and sound data retention and accuracy practices.23 This model works as an 
intermediary between strict regulation and entrepreneurial freedom. Most policies, however, do 
not comply with FTC guidelines.24 Although FTC threats of regulation have given firms an 
incentive to reign in irresponsible data collection practices, the FTC’s ability to sanction for 
noncompliance is limited and actions brought by the FTC are frequently based on firms 
misrepresenting practices outlined in its privacy policy.  
The Stored Communications Act of 1986 will only provide a temporary sigh of relief to 
privacy advocates. Companies that store and transmit user data are generally prohibited from 
“knowingly” sharing those records with the government.25 But this does not put and end to the 
commercialization of biometric data. FRSP’s are free to transmit data to other private parties such 
as data brokers. Data brokers are firms that buy and sell information about individuals for the 
purpose of aggregating the data to create individual profiles.26 This information may range from 
individual pieces of information, like age or weight, to more sensitive information, like web-
browsing histories, bank card transaction records, and driving records. FRSP’s may even operate 
 
22 Federal Trade Commission: Best Practices for Common Uses of Facial Recognition Technologies, p. 2 (2012). 
23 See generally Federal Trade Commission: Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: 
Recommendations for Businesses and Policymakers, (2012). 
24Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Understanding Privacy Policies: Content, Self-Regulation, and Markets, p. 4 (2016).  
25 Stored Communications Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C § 2702 (1986).   
26 Federal Trade Commission: DATA BROKERS: A Call for Transparency and Accountability, (2014).   
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as a data broker operation. This would allow them to sell biometric information directly to law 
enforcement, assuming no other state restriction bars the transaction. Clearview AI is an example 
of a FRSP that operates as a data broker.   
 As you have seen thus far, attitudes towards facial recognition gathering methods and 
application are somewhat mixed in the current climate. There is a sense that lawmakers and 
investors are becoming increasingly queasy about the ethics of its use. But as the technology 
develops and effective measures to reign in corrupt practices are discovered, its potential to be 
used as a robust crime-fighting tool is promising. This prospect makes FR a potentially rewarding 
space for tech startups and investors. In fact, market reports project the facial recognition industry 
to grow and develop in the coming years.27 Factors driving the market include increased 
technological advancements across verticals, a growing surveillance market, and rise in defense 
deployment. However, in light of the maelstrom of landmark global and domestic events in recent 
months including the impeachment of President Trump and the effects of the COVID-19 
pandemic, large-scale public debate over this topic has not come to full fruition. Most Americans 
may even find the topic overly confusing or obscure. This leaves the FR space at the mercy of an 
unforeseen shift in political sentiment. Should the sentiment cut against government use of FR, 
FRSP’s will have to discover novel and creative ways to employ the technology that comport with 
new laws—or abandon the project altogether. 
 But what happens if public sentiment remains mixed on government use of FR as a crime-
fighting tool? Given the volatility of this political climate, it isn’t unreasonable to assume that 
debate on this subject will continue to be pushed to the backburner of most political agendas. Keep 
in mind, most states have not passed any explicit restrictions on FR. More importantly, Illinois, 
 
27 MarketsandMarkets, Facial Recognition Market, (June, 2019), https://www.marketsandmarkets.com/Market-
Reports/facial-recognition-market-995.html. 
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Texas, and Washington are the only states to have passed legislation providing individuals with a 
private cause of action for having their biometric information collected.28 This means in the other 
forty-seven (47) states, FRSP’s are mostly free to engage in scraping. This poses a problem for 
staunch privacy advocates. In the face of a porous privacy regime and distracted state legislatures 
there is a severe lack of weapons in their arsenal to combat FR gathering and use. Consequently, 
in light of the growing prevalence of FR use in law enforcement, criminal defendants identified by 
FR will be on the front lines in the war against the technology using the Fourth Amendment as 
both sword and shield.   
I. The Biometrics Industry 
FRSP’s operate within the biometrics industry. The mass collection of biometric information 
has expanded rapidly in the past decade. According to a market research report by Application, 
Technology, Function, & Geography, “the biometrics market is expected to reach $32.73 billion 
by 2022.”29 More recent forecasts have the biometric technology market surpassing $44 billion 
globally by 2021.30 This could be due to the combination of spiraling use of the technology and 
lack of regulation the space. To put it simply, biometrics are biological measurements.31 Any 
physiological or behavioral trait can be characterized as a biometric characteristic. Examples 
 
28 Susan Crawford, Facial Recognition Laws Are (Literally) All Over the Map, Dec. 16, 2019, Wired, 
https://www.wired.com/story/facial-recognition-laws-are-literally-all-over-the-map/. 
29 Biometric System Market by Authentication Type (Single-Factor: (Fingerprint, IRIS, Palm 
Print, Face, Vein, Signature, Voice), Multi-Factor), Component (Hardware and Software), Function 
(Contact and Non-Contact), Application, and Region - Global Forecast to 2022, 
MARKETSANDMARKETS (Nov. 2016), http://www.marketsandmarkets.com/Market-Reports/nextgeneration-
biometric-technologies-market-697.html. 
30 Natasha Kohne, Isabelle Gold & Kamran Salour, Unique Biometric Data Creates Unique Privacy Concerns, 
NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL, 1 (Feb. 22, 2016). https://www.akingump.com/a/web/41212/aoi8x/070021626-
akin.pdf. 
31 See Definition: Biometrics, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/biometrics 
(defining biometrics as “the measurement and analysis of unique physical or behavioral characteristics (such as 
fingerprint or voice patterns) especially as a means of verifying personal identity”). 
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include hand geometry, fingerprints, DNA, retina, iris, or ear features, and—relevant to our 
purposes—faceprints.32  
The term “biometrics” is also used to describe a system. Biometric systems consist of three 
basic components: first, a device that captures the biometric characteristic; second, “software to 
convert the scanned biometric data into a standardized digital format and to compare [relevant] 
match points;” and third, “[a] database to securely store biometric data for comparison.33 The 
biometric information is compiled in a database, which are used to create an algorithm of an 
individual’s biometric characteristics. In the context of FR, this would include biometric nodes on 
one’s face.34 Once in the database, the data can be used to verify an individual or identify an 
unknown person using new information.35  
The government and private businesses gather vast amounts of biometric data for a myriad of 
purposes. Private companies buy and sell this information to each other, and in some cases, directly 
to the government, creating a commercialized industry for sensitive information.36 Readers new to 
this space may be new to the value such information has to innovators. Biometric characteristics 
provide extraordinarily unique datasets for many companies, not just law enforcement. For 
 
32 Grandview Research, Biometrics Technology Market Analysis Report By End-Use (Government, Banking & 
Finance, Transport/Logistics, Defense & Security), By Application (AFIS, Iris, Non-AFIS), and Segment Forecasts, 
2018 – 2025, GRAND VIEW RESEARCH, (2018). https://www.grandviewresearch.com/industry-
analysis/biometrics-industry.  
33 See Margaret Rouse, Definition: Biometric Verification, SEARCHSECURITY.COM, 
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/biometric-verification (last updated May 2008). 
34 See Infra note 29.  
35 Erin M. Sales, Note, The “Biometric Revolution”: An Erosion of the Fifth Amendment 
Privilege to be Free from Self-Incrimination, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 193, 213–14 (2014). 
36 Gregory James Evans, Comment, Regulating Data Practices: How State Laws Can Shore 
Up the FTC’s Authority to Regulate Data Breaches, Privacy, and More, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 187, 195 
(2015). 
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example, if a patient cannot communicate their symptoms, a provider can scan the patient’s voice 
and access his/her records to identify the illness.37  
Businesses are using biometric data in ways the average consumer may engage with daily 
without recognizing. Companies may employ biometric technologies to increase efficiency and 
reduce fraud. Consider a modern update to the time clock for employees logging in and out of 
work. Biometric readers allow workers to simply tap their fingerprints onto a biometric fingerprint 
scanner, as opposed to punching a timecard. This can reduce a practice called “buddy-time” 
punching to increase workplace efficiency and accountability.38 Many tanning salons and gyms 
allow members to enter and use the facility by simply using a fingerprint scanner.39 Banks are 
researching ways to use biometric data to curb identity theft, and some have successfully 
implemented measures. Citi Bank has introduced a voice authentication system to identify the 
identities of customers explaining issues to customer service representatives over the phone.40 
Wells Fargo uses eye-print authentication as an added security layer for clients to view account 
balances, make deposits, and approve payments from mobile devices.41 Even more interesting is 
Barclays’s Finger Vein reader Technology. customers simply place a finger inside a small desktop 
scanner instead of entering passwords and PINs.42 
Biometric technologies clearly provide a boost to consumer experience, but the 
commercialization of such sensitive data appears to create perverse incentives. We are now in a 
 
37 Definitive Healthcare, 3 Ways Biometric Technology Improves Hospital Performance, DEFINITIVE 
HEALTHCARE, (Jan. 8, 2020). https://blog.definitivehc.com/ways-biometric-technology-improves-healthcare. 
38 See Dixon v Washington and Lee Smith Community-Beverly, et al., 2018 WL 2445292 (USDC IL ND, 
20180531). 
39 Jason Knowles, Finger scanning gaining in popularity, raising security concerns, ABC 7 (Feb. 6, 2015). 
https://abc7chicago.com/finger-printing-fingerprints-prints-biometric-screening/507502/. 
40 Alison Arthur & Bethany Frank, Five Examples of Biometrics in Banking, ALACRITI (May, 8, 2019). 
https://www.alacriti.com/biometrics-in-banking. 
41 Alison Arthur & Bethany Frank, Supra Note 39.  
42 Alison Arthur & Bethany Frank, Supra Note 39. 
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situation where the business gathers intimate, personal information and sells it to buyers that 
consumers may not have wished to expose themselves to, like the government. And the United 
States privacy regime does not give individuals the power to protect their privacy by controlling 
the personal data gathered, collected, stored, and sold by the private industry.43 This is problematic 
given the “private industry tracks 24/7 our physical location, online travels, friends, activities, likes 
and dislikes, preferences (including religious and sexual), personal status (married, divorced, or 
single), and financial status. Such tracking is accomplished in myriad ways and, more increasingly, 
it is done using individuals’ biometric identifiers.”44 Later on you will see that this is a concern for 
Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court.45 
The companies mentioned thus far that have employed biometric technologies are considered 
FRSP’s for purposes of this project. These companies use biometric technology in what many may 
consider to be anodyne ways. However, the main concern that privacy advocates have is the 
sharing of this information—and not necessarily with other private companies, but with data 
brokers. As mentioned in the Introduction section of this project, data brokers. Recall that data 
brokers are firms that buy and sell information about individuals for the purpose of aggregating 
the data to create individual profiles.46 Data brokers, unlike companies that typically employ FR, 
don’t deal directly with consumers, allowing them to sell information directly to the government. 
Consumers may be inadvertently conveying private information to the government via private 
businesses that sell their biometric data to data brokers. 
 
 
43 Anne T. McKenna, Pass Parallel Privacy Standards or Privacy Perishes, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 1041, 1042 
(2013). 
44 Id. at 1043.  
45 Infra Note 89. 
46 Federal Trade Commission, Supra Note 26.  
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II. How Facial Recognition Technology is Used 
 Before traversing through the legal terrain of FR, it’s important to know how the 
technology works in practice. Although the thought of FR seems hyper-futuristic, the technology 
is currently used in many ways. The technology is easy to understand when broken down step by 
step. This method of learning helps avoid thinking about facial recognition in an overly abstract 
fashion that clouds our judgment in assessing FR’s position in the legal terrain. 
 Consumers may purchase a facial recognition camera with the technology already 
embedded or can reconfigure the components of the camera to function as a facial recognition 
camera. The latter may take considerable time and effort to execute, so most consumers simply 
purchase a camera with facial recognition already embedded. The camera will then capture an 
image of a face, alone or in a crowd.47 FR strays from traditional surveillance in the sense that the 
typical camera captures naked images. FR captures and measures an individual’s biometric 
nodes.48 Examples of biometric nodes include the distance between the nose and eyes, the amount 
and type of skin pores one has, and relative position of the nose, jaws, and cheekbones.49 
Individuals will often be under the mistaken impression that the camera is operating as a traditional 
security layer when in fact it is collecting biometric data.50 Many grocery stores, schools, and 
airports use facial recognition cameras.51  
 The analysis of a face is then turned into a mathematical formula.52 These facial features 
become numbers in a code. This numerical code is called a faceprint. Similar to the unique 
structure of a thumbprint, each person has their own faceprint. That faceprint is then compared to 
 
47 Electric Frontier Foundation, Facial Recognition, (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.eff.org/pages/face-recognition. 
48 Panda Security, The Complete Guide to Facial Recognition Technology, 2019, 
https://www.pandasecurity.com/mediacenter/panda-security/facial-recognition-technology/. 
49 Panda Security, supra note 22.  
50 Panda Security, supra note 22.  
51 Electric Frontier Foundation, supra note 21.  
52 Panda Security, supra note 22. 
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a database comprised of other faceprints and finds a match if available. Law enforcement mostly 
uses FR for investigatory leads because such evidence is not yet admissible in most courts.53 The 
FBI has access to more than 641 million photos, including 21 state databases such as Division of 
Motor Vehicles (DMV).54 There are questions as to the technology’s ability to accurately identify 
a match. A report on the use of face recognition in the UK found that the technology led to false 
matches over 90 percent of the time.55 Academic research has also already shown that face 
recognition is less accurate for non-white faces and women.56 Law enforcement primarily employs 
FR in two scenarios: When a suspect has been detained but there is no other way to identify the 
suspect, or when footage of an unidentified suspect is captured.57 Assuming the image is of 
sufficient quality, law enforcement will input the suspect’s faceprint into the system to identify a 
potential match.58  
III. The Inefficiency of Traditional Fourth Amendment Doctrine in the Context of Big Data 
Cybersurveillance  
Applying the Fourth Amendment in the Digital Age has been a common cause for 
consternation among judges. Since Katz v. United States, the “reasonable expectation of privacy” 
standard has governed the Fourth Amendment analysis.59 The court strayed from its original 
 
53 See People v. Collins, 15 N.Y.S.3d 564, 576 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015).  
54 Neema Singh Guliani, The FBI Has Access to Over 640 Million Photos of Us Through Its Facial Recognition 
Database, ACLU (June 7, 2019), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/fbi-has-
access-over-640-million-photos-us-through. 
55 Brendan F. Klare, et al., Face recognition performance: Role of demographic information, IEEE Transactions on 
Information Forensics and Security, p. 10-11, (2012). 
56 Brendan F. Klare, et al., supra note 27, at 12.; Joy Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional 
Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification, Proceedings of Machine Learning Research, 1, 12 
(2018). 
57 Kaitlin Jackson, Challenging Facial Recognition Software in Criminal Court, July 2019, NACDL.ORG, 
https://www.nacdl.org/getattachment/548c697c-fd8e-4b8d-b4c3-2540336fad94/challenging-facial-recognition-
software-in-criminal-court_july-2019.pdf. 
58 Kaitlin Jackson, supra note 29.  
59 389 U.S. 347. (holding that the FBI’s wiretapping of a public phone booth violated the suspect’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy). 
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private-public space distinction and adopted a reasonableness standard.60 If the suspect exhibits a 
reasonable expectation of privacy and the public at-large is prepared to recognize that expectation 
as reasonable, then the government must execute a search warrant before surveilling the suspect.61  
But discerning what actions are reasonable to a law enforcement officer in the cyber context 
proves difficult. Courts approach this inquiry by balancing the government’s interests in the search 
and the privacy interests of the individual. If the government’s interests outweigh the individual’s 
interests, the search is reasonable. Whether a search is reasonable, however, rests on the 
assumption that the search is a readily identifiable act over a readily identifiable period of time. 
This assumption allows courts to categorically determine situations and contexts where society 
would expect a reasonable expectation of privacy. For example, cars have been held to be less 
private than homes. Probable cause need only be shown to search a car, but a warrant is almost 
always needed to search a house. 
There are ample exceptions to the need for a search warrant. Relevant to FR gathering, 
there is the third-party doctrine. When a person hands over personal information to a private third 
party, that person has presumptively forfeited his reasonable expectation of privacy.62 United 
States v. Carpenter, however, has carved an exception to this exception for cell phone data.63 
Another relevant exception is the plain-view doctrine. When a person is engaged in unlawful 
activity in a manner open for public view, he forfeits his reasonable expectation of privacy.64 Law 
enforcement frequently relies on these exceptions to justify big data surveillance of suspects. There 
are many other exceptions to warrants that are not as relevant to FR data gathering and application. 
 
60 Katz, 398 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
61 Id. 
62 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).  
63Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). (holding that given the unique nature of cell phone location 
records, the fact that the user’s data is held be a third party does not overcome the user’s claim to Fourth 
Amendment protection).   
64 United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927).  
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There are unique contexts whereby courts disregard the existence of a plausible exception. 
Cell-site data is an example where the data is so intrusive as to outweigh the application of the 
third-party doctrine.65 Moreover, government use of technology not available for public use 
generally has been deemed a search. In Kyllo v. United States, the Supreme Court determined that 
law enforcement’s use of thermal imaging technology to obtain information from the inside of a 
home constituted a search.66 Even though law enforcement was on a public street at the time, the 
use of the thermal imaging to obtain information that would otherwise have required law 
enforcement to enter the home concerned the Court.67 Some scholars have considered the 
application of Kyllo in terms of the limited availability of thermal imaging to FR.68 
The gathering of biometric nodes alone might pose a Fourth Amendment problem per se. 
A fair argument could be made that individuals always have a subjective reasonable expectation 
of their biometric nodes. Individuals have consistently been held to have forfeited their subjective 
expectation of privacy when walking out in public. But how far does that expectation go? A 
married couple may not possess a subjective expectation of privacy when promenading through 
the park, but does it necessarily follow that they subjected themselves to having the measurement 
between their nose and eyes measured and their skin pores counted? The courts have not ruled on 
this question yet. However, as the public’s awareness of biometric data gathering increases, the 
societal expectation of privacy decreases; thus, eroding privacy rights.69  
As big data cybersurveillance grew increasingly sophisticated, judges’ frustration with the 
traditional Katz test kept pace. Courts became jaded by the traditional common law approach, 
 
65 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
66 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001).  
67 Id. at 34.  
68 See Joseph N. Pato & Lynette I. Millet, Biometric Recognition: Challenges and Opportunities 106–107 (2010).  
69 Bert-Jaap Koops & Ronald Leenes, 'Code' and the Slow Erosion of Privacy, MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. 
REV. 115, 132 (2005). 
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yearning for a new, capable set of tools to navigate the legal universe of big data cybersurveillance. 
These frustrations are best illuminated in Judge Leon’s opinion in Klayman v. Obama: “the Smith 
pen register and the ongoing NSA Bulk Telephony Metadata Program have so many significant 
distinctions between them that I cannot possibly navigate these uncharted Fourth Amendment 
waters using as my North Star a case that predates the rise of cell phones.”70 As mentioned 
previously, the principal area of frustration in applying the traditional Fourth Amendment analysis 
to big data cybersurveillance seems to be the fundamental axiom on which the analysis rests—
That all government action can be analyzed as an isolated event. In United States v. Maynard, the 
D.C. Circuit introduced a different approach dubbed the "mosaic theory" of the Fourth Amendment 
by legal scholars.71 Under the mosaic theory, searches can be analyzed as a collective sequence of 
steps rather than as individual steps. To fully understand the mosaic theory, it is important to flesh 
out the facts of Maynard and dissect the legal reasoning at the Circuit Court and Supreme Court 
levels.  
IV. The Genesis of the Mosaic Theory 
Antoine Jones owned and operated a nightclub in Washington D.C.72 In 2004 he came under 
suspicion of drug trafficking and was the main target of a law enforcement investigation.73 Various 
methods were used to investigate Jones including visual surveillance of the nightclub and wiretaps 
on his cell phone.74 Using the information gathered from these methods, the Government obtained 
a warrant from the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to install a GPS tracking device 
 
70 957 F. Supp. 2d at 30-37 (D.D.C. 2013).  
71 Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311 (2012). 
72 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 549.  
73 Id. 
74 United States v. Jones, 451 F Supp. 2d 71, 74 (D.D.C. 2006), aff'd in part, rev'd in 
part sub nom. United States v. Maynard, 615 E3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff'd sub nom. United 
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
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(GPS) on the car of Jones’s wife.75 The warrant authorized installation of the device for ten (10) 
days, but the agents were unable to install the device until the eleventh day.76 The GPS was 
installed on the car for twenty-eight (28) days, tracking the vehicle’s movements.77 The GPS 
communicated Jones’s location to a government computer, consisting of 2,000 pages of data over 
the twenty-eight (28) day span.78  
Jones was convicted at trial and appealed. The trial court’s admission of the GPS evidence was 
based on the Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Knotts.79 Knotts permitted the use of a 
radio beeper located in a car that broadcasted the car's location to the police nearby.80 The legal 
theory in Knotts was that an individual who willingly drives on public roads “willingly conveys” 
to the public that anyone can look at where they’re travelling at any time. In other words, Jones 
relinquished his expectation of privacy when he drove through public roads, therefore, the 
installation of the GPS did not require a warrant.  
Jones argued on appeal that GPS is distinguishable from a beeper.81 GPS gathers so much data 
about a person’s physical movements across time and space as to intrude into the private details 
of that person’s life. The D.C. Circuit agreed with Jones and reversed his conviction. Judge 
Douglas Ginsburg first tackled the distinction between GPS and beepers. He explained that Knotts 
was distinguishable because Knotts did not involve a “dragnet-type law enforcement practice” as 
used against Jones.82 Jones’s case involved 24-hour surveillance; Knotts’s case did not. Ginsburg 
 
75 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 United States v. Maynard, 615 F3d 544, 568 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 
945 (2012). 
80 460 U.S. 276 (1983).  
81 See Brief for Appellants at 54, United States v. Maynard, 615 F3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 
2010).  
82 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 556-58 (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283-84 (1983)). 
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held that that different constitutional principles apply to dragnet-type law enforcement practices 
like 24-hour GPS surveillance.83  
Ginsberg’s brilliant sleight of hand from Knotts facilitated a smooth transition into the genesis 
of the mosaic theory—the tool that judges, including Judge Leon, across the country have been 
longing for. The court held that Jones’s movements were not constructively exposed through the 
observable nature of each individual movement because the whole reveals more than does the sum 
of its parts.84 This is where the mosaic analogy comes in. Judge Ginsburg reasoned that individual 
pieces of data—when viewed collectively—can equal more than the sum of its parts.85 A single 
piece of tile in a mosaic is just a single tile, which tells nothing. But if enough tiles are collected, 
after careful thought, one can paint the whole picture. Because society would find Jones’s 
expectation of privacy over the intimate details of his life over a month-long period to be 
reasonable, the government’s warrantless GPS installation was unconstitutional. The mosaic 
framework opens the possibility that a series of nonsearches by law enforcement could amount to 
a search. 
The Supreme Court unanimously agreed with Ginsburg’s conclusion that Jones was the subject 
of a search but the rationales differed.86 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that the 
installation of the GPS was a trespass on the “effects” of the car, relying on the public-private 
trespass distinction used frequently prior to Katz.87 The mosaic theory was never mentioned in his 
opinion. Five Justices wrote or joined opinions that did, however, touch on the mosaic theory. 
Justice Alito was joined by four other Justices in his concurring opinion.88 He found Knotts to be 
 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 562 
85 Id. 
86 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
87 Id. at 951-54 
88 Id. at 957-64 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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applicable but narrowly read Knotts as applying to short-term monitoring of a person’s 
movements. Justice Alito believed that law enforcement was not capable of the twenty-eight (28) 
day monitoring of Jones without the use of GPS.89  
Alito’s opinion is interesting for a few reasons. Justice Alito applied the reasonable expectation 
of privacy test by invoking expectations of how law enforcement investigate particular crimes.90 
He argues that society would not consider law enforcement capable of tracking the movements of 
a vehicle without GPS.91 Justice Alito does not appear to completely write off the use of GPS 
tracking in a criminal investigation, however. It is critical to keep in mind that Justice Alito did 
not consider Jones’s offenses “extraordinary.” As such, the GPS monitoring was beyond what 
society would deem reasonable.92 What makes this reasoning somewhat cryptic is his scant 
citations to authority. This reasoning seems to shift from what the public might see (i.e., the 
behavior the individual in question is believed to have engaged in) to what society would expect 
law enforcement to do given the circumstances. This is a fascinating, nuanced approach 
considering the mosaic theory has the effect of cracking down on intrusive technologies. But this 
reasoning suggests that maybe BOSS employed by a government agency, paired with the use of 
other investigatory techniques, could be perfectly legal when used in the context of asymmetric 
threats. Therefore, with the exception of more serious offenses, society Justice Alito did not find 
the extensiveness of the search in question reasonable considering the lack of seriousness of 
Jones’s offense.93  
 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
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The fifth Justice to apply the mosaic theory was Justice Sotomayor. She reasoned that the use 
of GPS was unique in that GPS has the capability of shining a light onto the precise details of one’s 
life:94  
I would take these attributes of GPS monitoring into account when considering the 
existence of a reasonable societal expectation of privacy in the sum of one's public 
movements. I would ask whether people reasonably expect that their movements 
will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to 
ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and 
so on.95 
She suggested that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in “the sum of” their 
public movements.96 Justice Alito and Justice Sotomayor appear to interpret the mosaic theory 
slightly differently. Justice Alito focuses on the relation of law enforcement’s techniques to the 
particular crime in question. The more serious the offense, the more extensive techniques the 
government can employ in its investigation.97  
Sotomayor’s reasoning mirrors Judge Douglas Ginsburg’s reasoning. As such, using the 
previous analogy, BOSS employed by a government agency, paired with the use of other 
investigatory techniques, may be illegal—even when used in the context of asymmetric threats. 
This is because Justice Sotomayor appears to focus on the quantity of data collected versus 
society’s expectation of the methods employed by law enforcement when balanced against the 
offense committed. This is still, however, somewhat cryptic. How much information is too much? 
How intimate is too intimate? By what standard of intelligence are we measuring the degree of 
intimacy against? Undoubtedly, a smarter individual is more capable of drawing inferences than 
less-smart individuals. Questions like these raise the issue of applying Sotomayor and Ginsburg’s 
 
94 Id. at 955-56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
95 Id. at 956.  
96 Id. 
97 See id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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version of the mosaic theory. Both Justices, however, measure the collective sum of the 
government action in determining whether a search occurs—the key takeaway for FRSP’s. 
Law enforcement has been paying close attention to how the mosaic theory is interpreted by 
courts. The FBI turned off 3,000 tracking devices shortly after the Jones opinion was handed 
down.98 This reflects the effect that the impetus of Fourth Amendment doctrine might be having 
on the biometric industry in spite of its positive trends. The uncertainty of the mosaic theory, in 
particular, raises problems. As mentioned, Justice Alito’s approach seems to be less restrictive on 
biometric technology applications in contexts involving serious offenses. In contrast, Justice 
Sotomayor’s approach provides no such safety net. This approach would be problematic for 
biometric technology providers—and especially FRSP’s due to the private nature of faceprints. 
V. The Effects of Fourth Amendment Doctrine on Facial Recognition Service Providers  
Although the Fourth Amendment has been traditionally applied to state action, FRSP’s would 
be wise to harmonize their gathering methods with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The main 
reason being that most FRSP’s, depending on how significantly sales of biometric data contribute 
to their revenue stream, don’t want to risk having to erase their already-stored data and reshape 
their gathering methods should the courts come along and clamp down on indirect Fourth 
Amendment abuses. It’s not clear that the government is permitted to do something indirectly that 
is prohibited from doing directly. For example, let’s assume the a database a FRSP conveys to law 
enforcement contains images of persons possessing a reasonable expectation of privacy (i.e., if 
law enforcement were to have gathered the image, it would have been a violation of the 
individual’s Fourth Amendment right). Can law enforcement access that image without a search 
warrant? As we already know, there are no statutory restrictions on data brokers selling a person’s 
 
98 Ariane de Vogue, Supreme Court Ruling Prompts FBI to Turn Off 3,000 Tracking Devices, YAHOO! NEWS 
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personal information directly to law enforcement. But the lack of attention on voluntary data-
sharing between law enforcement and the private sector is both problematic and puzzling.99 
Chief Justice Roberts made clear that if police want access to seven (7) days’ worth or more 
of cell-site data from companies like Verizon or AT&T, a warrant is needed.100 This logic would 
seem to apply whether the government is subpoenaing the data or buying it. To be clear, 
government contracts to purchase data from FRSP’s that operate as data brokers do not currently 
evoke the Fourth Amendment.101 But in light of Carpenter, there’s no telling whether the courts 
could step in and prevent indirect Fourth Amendment infringements in the future.  
FRSP’s, especially those operating as data brokers, would be wise to scrape images of persons 
who have clearly forfeited their reasonable expectation of privacy. For example, photos posted on 
social media and video surveillance of individuals at parks or malls. Also, FRSP’s should limit the 
amount of information they gather when scraping so as to avoid painting a mosaic of a person’s 
life. For example, the technology should go no further than scraping the biometric nodes and name 
of the individual. Information such as the individual’s employment, education, relationships, or 
the like should strongly be discouraged from gathering. The technology should be geared to gather 
biometric nodes and biometric nodes, alone. Keep in mind that individuals currently have no 
federal cause of action to remove information from a privacy merchant’s records.  
This advice may not appear to be commercially mellifluous to the ear of a FRSP. On first 
intuition, the recommendations thus far would appear to render the product less marketable 
compared to the product containing private, intimate details held by other FRSP’s. But consider 
 
99 There are a few exceptions. See e.g., Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Outsourced Law Enforcement, 
18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 797 (2016); Eugene L. Shapiro, Governmental Acquiescence in Private Party 
Searches: the State Action Inquiry and Lessons from the Federal Circuits, 104 KY. L. J. 287 (2016); 
Elizabeth E. Joh, The Paradox of Private Policing, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49 (2004); David 
A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165 (1999). 
100 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).  
101 Amitai Etzioni, Reining in Private Agents, MINN. L. REV. 279, 282 (2016).  
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the impetus of Fourth Amendment doctrine in recent years. The idea of purchasing a pandora’s 
box of potentially overly private information may be exactly what the government wishes to avoid. 
The government doesn’t want data that they could not access without a search warrant. More 
importantly, the government does not want to use data as evidence that eventually falls victim to 
an exclusionary-rule theory at trial. The government wants to spend precious budgetary resources 
on reliable, durable data. Also remember that government officials like police officers are 
employing a vast array of tools in a criminal investigation. Intimate, personal information relating 
to, for example, a person’s job history, banking records, etc., may not just be irrelevant, but 
redundant. Police departments want to use FR in as limited capacity as possible so as to avoid big-
brother depictions by the defense during the prosecution.  
This project has laid out potential permanent blockades to government use of FR. What 
then? Should the federal moratorium, or ban, on FR be signed into law, all hope is not lost for 
FRSP’s. You may recall the discussion at the beginning of this note about how the technology is 
still developing. Experts believe that as the technology develops, ideas and methods for curbing 
abuse of the technology will keep pace. Moreover, there is no discussion of banning the sale or 
manufacturing of the technology itself. Private businesses—in conformity with biometric privacy 
laws, among others—will always have an interest in using the technology.  
What if courts grow overly suspicious of FR and hold that individuals always have a 
subjective or societal expectation of privacy? In this event, data brokers that have successfully 
managed to commercialize biometric information may have to diversify their client base. This base 
could include actors that perform operations in a similar capacity to the government, such as 
private investigators and security firms. Recall the discussion about the present flourishing of the 
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facial recognition market.102 One of the factors driving the market’s growth is a rise in defense 
deployment.103 FRSP’s could assess the needs of military forces and defense contractors to tailor 
the technology to their needs in an area where U.S. privacy laws are laxer in application.104  
As it stands, investments in facial recognition technology are on the rise.105 To maintain 
this trend, FRSP’s would be wise to conform to FTC guidelines as both a legal and—more 
importantly—a public-relations solution. The biggest threat to facial recognition is the public. If 
abuse or other corrupt practices draw unwanted attention, the industry may wake the sleeping 
giant. Investors know this. Bad publicity feeds into the uncertainty surrounding the legality of FR, 
and too much uncertainty persuades investors to look elsewhere. Tech investors are well-known 
risk-takers, but only to an extent.  
This project has focused mostly on the slippery-slope implications of FR under current law 
and where the law could take a sour turn for FRSP’s. This is due to the trajectory of Fourth 
Amendment doctrine in recent years. But keep in mind, the reverse could also occur. As time 
passes, courts could hold that due to the ubiquity of technology and social media and the public’s 
enhanced awareness of private data sharing, we willfully forfeit our Fourth Amendment rights in 
many contexts.106 In her book, Taking Liberties: The War on Terror and the Erosion of American 
Democracy, Susan N. Herman says, “familiarity breeds acceptance.”107 She writes, “Once we 
become accustomed to a new baseline, like bag searches or body scanners at the airport, those 
practices, like the idea of watchlists, are likely to proliferate.”108 She explains that once these 
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measures are introduced, they become commonplace; And we breed an acceptance to these safety 
measures without truly understanding their effectiveness.109  
Such an outcome would prove a boon to FRSP’s acting as data brokers. With the mosaic 
theory still holding as the minority position of analyzing Fourth Amendment issues in the context 
of big data cybersurveillance, FR would meet the Katz test. This is, however, unlikely for a few 
reasons. For one, the majority of society is still largely unaware of the prevalence and scope of 
private and public data sharing.110 This unawareness, however, should not be confused with 
indifference.111 Second, such a maneuver would practically scrap the Fourth Amendment 
completely in a time where technology is the primary tool in criminal investigations. Third, courts 
prefer leaving sensitive issues such as this to the states. This is another reason why the duration 
and scope of FR gathering and use is largely at the mercy of public sentiment.  
Conclusion 
 The war between privacy concerns surrounding FR and the utility of FR as a robust 
crime-fighting tool is a fascinating one. The weakness of privacy regimes at the federal and state 
level in this area have left staunch privacy advocates to mostly rely on criminal defendants 
fighting FR on Fourth Amendment theories. A federal ban on government use of facial 
recognition has been drafted, but in light of the maelstrom of landmark global and domestic 
events in recent months, public support surrounding its passage remains uncertain. FRSP’s 
operating as data brokers are mostly free to engage in scraping and sell personal information 
directly to the government but should proceed with caution. Information related to the personal, 
intimate details of one’s life should be avoided in the event the mosaic theory becomes widely 
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adopted. FRSP’s should have contingency plans in place in the event the logic in Carpenter 
extends to contracts between data brokers and law enforcement. These contingency plans should 
include the diversification of client bases and compliance with the FTC’s best practices guideline 
for facial recognition. The FR market is flourishing, but efforts to avoid investor uncertainty 
need to improve to maintain these trends.   
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
